The Ufton Nervet rail crash occured on November 6, 2004, at approximately 100mph, an First Great Western High Speed Train left London Paddington station en route to Plymouth. As the train reached the Ufton Nervet level crossing, a car was blocking the track. The power car leading the train derailed after the collision. For around 95 meters, the train continued to travel along the track before derailed wheels encountered a set of points. The accident became the first ever major rail accident in Britain in the 21st century, resulting in the loss of seven lives (including the train driver, five passengers and the driver of the car) and several others sustaining injuries. This accident was also a phenomena in rail safety due to the level of risk posed by level crossings and the unquantifiable risk of train collisions. The train that was being used was the First Great Western service departing Paddington station at 5:35 PM and arriving at Plymouth. This train was an InterCity 125 High Speed Train that had two Class 43 power cars with eight passenger cars. For the departure that night from Paddington, first class seating was located behind the leading power car with a buffet car and standard class seating behind. The train arrived at Reading on time.
The train departed Reading at 6:03pm, one minute later than expected, heading west towards Ufton Nervet.
The train line reached a maximum speed of 100 mph on that stretch of track.
At around 6:11pm, the train reached the spot where the Ufton level crossing sequence would begin. The crossing lights, audible alarms, and barricades started to function.
The Down line crossing was obstructed by a stationary Mazda 323.
The investigation revealed the vehicle was stopped on the crossing prior to the beginning of the crossing sequence.
There was really nothing the train driver could do to avoid the collision.
The Train Collides With The Mazda
The HST hit the Mazda at a high speed, crushing the Mazda and scattering debris on the track.
More importantly for the train, the collision caused the leading wheelset of the front bogie of the leading power car to derail to the left.
Initially, the train did not completely leave the rail.
The derailed bogie remained broadly parallel with the track as it traveled for approximately 95 meters.
If the track in front of the train remained a straight plain track, the final outcome may have been different.
However, the train had reached the facing points for the Down Goods Loop.
The bogie was diverted to the left by the diverging rails. This led to an unstable condition on the remainder of the train and caused a complete derailment of the HST.
Some cars uncoupled as couplings failed, while some bogies became detached in the series of events.
The leading car, after coming to rest 360 meters away from the major derailment, sustained the most damage after stopping.
The other car, without power, stopped around 165 meters from it.
The accident had caused so much damage to the train and the facilities of the railway.
Seven Lives Lost
The effects of the crash in the train were very serious.
Five passengers and the driver of the First Great Western train lost their lives along with the driver of the car. Thus, the total deaths were seven.
Many others became injured.
71 injuries were documented by investigating authorities, twelve of which were categorized as very serious.
The crash site was very busy for a long time as emergency services and the rail ways employees were actively involved in a rescue operation. The subsequent investigation stated that the operation was fast and efficient due to the major scale of the damage. Most of the passengers were evacuated successfully.
The various authorities investigated the crash of the car and the driver separately from the technical response of the rail ways.
The focus of the rail ways industry was to explain how the collision of the rail ways with a small vehicle on the road caused such a big derailment. An explanation of how such a case could be prevented was also investigated.
Why Was the Derailment So Severe?
One of the most important facts was that the points immediately after the crossing were located just beyond the leading wheelset.
It was the subsequent meeting with the facing points some 95 meters away that accounts for an almost complete derailment.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch later compared Ufton Nervet to a similar incident of 2006, a high-speed collision of a train with a car at Copmanthorpe.
Both incidents occurred at nearly 100 mph. The results were quite disparate.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch gave their reasons for the different results.
In the case of the train striking a car at Ufton Nervet, the car’s impact also caused the train to derail. The type of crossing surface may have also contributed to the train derailment by allowing debris to accumulate underneath.
The derailed train also struck the facing points.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch said this difference was the main cause of the severe outcome at Ufton Nervet.
So, what we learned from this tragic incident was the nature of rail accidents. Infrastructure that is almost identical can drastically change the outcome of seemingly similar accidents.
The Railway Was Operating Correctly
The investigators found that the accident was not a result of a failure in the railway.
Shortly after the accident, the Health and Safety Executive reported that the crossing guards, the staff, and the train had no role in the accidents.
The half barrier crossing had functioned correctly.
The car was placed on the tracks before the crossing guards were deployed, and the train drove over the car.
This was the key to understanding this accident.
Automatic half-barrier crossings are mean to allow vehicles to cross and give trains the right of way. These crossings do not prevent vehicles being driven onto the tracks.
Beyond investigating whether the equipment functioned as designed, the investigation also explored whether there were technologies that could further reduce the risk.
Safety Lessons From Ufton Nervet
The Last Report of the RSSB Level Crossings Working Group made seven recommendations for level crossings.
One of the questions posed was, can an automatic half-barrier crossing detect an obstruction and warn the driver of an approaching train?
Detecting an obstruction does not, by itself, mean a train can be stopped.
A train traveling at 100 miles per hour requires a long distance to come to a stop. By the time a vehicle enters or stops on a crossing, there is likely not enough distance to avoid a collision.
Ufton Nervet also prompted the exploring of passenger protection.
Among the behavior of train windows, and how to retain windows as emergency escape routes in the event of a car derailment, and the difficulty of balancing window designs that restrain passengers, the accident prompted many other studies.
The accident also provided researchers with many valuable lessons in how the windows and passenger restraint systems would behave in the event of a high-speed collision or derailment.
Ufton Nervet Remained a Concern
The crossing did not end in 2004.
On Sept. 4, 2011, there was another serious sighting at Ufton when a passenger train crossed at 61 mph with the barriers up and no flashing road traffic signals.
A vehicle approaching the railway had to stop to avoid a collision.
The crossing was controlled manually rather than automatically due to some engineering work.
RAIB noted that communications were not done and also mentioned issues like the workload of the signaller.
No one was hurt, but the near miss brought the concern of the site again.
The best solution to the risk of vehicles crossing the railway at a level crossing is to remove the level crossing.
Finally, Ufton Nervet got this solution.
In 2016, the level crossing was replaced by a road crossing to the railway, and the crossing of the two transport systems was eliminated by the new crossing.
Closing or replacing level crossings is the objective of Network Rail across the UK where level crossings can be closed.
This has been made possible due to Ufton Nervet.
Ufton Nervet will be remembered for its collision.
More than two decades later, this is an important incident in modern UK rail safety.
This showed how a functioning railway system could still lead to a major incident when an external barrier was intentionally put on a high speed line.
It showed how the outcome of the first collision was changed by what a derailed train struck next.
This accident prompted research into barrier systems, car crashworthiness, passenger safety and the behavior of trains during derailments.
Rail safety has always grown from many accidents and many recommendations. It grows from investigations and discoveries that evolve engineering over decades.
Ufton Nervet became a part of that evolution.
However, engineering changes happen long after the reports and recommendations are published, and even farther from the dates of the events.
For many people who live near the track, the date is one that will always be remembered.
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